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SOCIAL INSURANCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS
Students of the development of constitutional limitations upon
legislative power in the United States will find an interesting
parallel in the history of the Roman confessional. Confronted
with the alternative of adhering rigorously to the primitive
standards of Christian conduct and of "contrition" for mis-
conduct, or of relaxing these standards in the interest of broaden-
ing its supervision of the lives of its communicants, the Church
has generally chosen the latter course. Similarly, it is the
"laxists" rather than the "rigorists" who have determined the
final character of our constitutional law.
Forty years ago constitutional law still rested in great part
upon the foundations originally supplied it by eighteenth century
political philosophy, upon the reciprocally implied yet recipro-
cally contradicted notions of the "sovereignty" of the state and
the "natural rights" of the citizen. It thus resulted that, within
a very broad field, the authority of the state legislature was
treated as legally illimitable, at least in the absence of specific
provision to the contrary, while in a much narrower field, com-
prising especially what were called "vested rights," private
rights were treated as indefeasible. To-day constitutional law,
both on its negative and on its positive side, is much more
flexible. On the one hand, judicial interpretation of the phrases
"liberty," "property," and "due process of law," especially as
these are used in the Fourteenth Amendment, leaves judicial con-
trol of state legislation with none but the vaguest limits. On the
other hand, judicial definition of "the police power" as the power
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of the state to promote "the general welfare" by legislation
"reasonably adapted" to that end, renders this widely extended
supervision highly elastic.
But while this is true enough as a general statement of the
matter, certain recent events make it clear that constitutional
"rigorism" still maintains certain outposts from which it must
be dislodged, if our system of constitutional limitations is to be
adapted to the needs of modem complex society. The recent
judicial utterance most to the point in this connection is the much
debated decision of the New York Court of Appeals in the Ives
case,1 in which a Workmen's Compensation act was overturned.
The court admitted that the statute involved dealt with appre-
ciable evils, that it had been drawn up with great care and only
after diligent investigation, and that it met the best opinion on
the subject. Yet in the face of these admissions, the act was
pronounced void on two grounds: first, because it imposed
"liability without fault" upon certain classes of employers and
so, in effect, confiscated property of A and gave it to B; sec-
ondly, because it comprised "an unreasonable regulation of the
status of employment," and so deprived both employers and
employees of their "freedom of contract." The obstacles inter-
posed by this type of doctrine to Workmen's Compensation acts
have since been overcome in a measure by what is known as the
"elective" statute-but only in a measure--and the menace of
it to Minimum Wage legislation and other Social Insurance
projects is apparent. And the general issue raised is even farther
reaching. It is whether legislation, which is otherwise well within
the police power, is to be treated as invalid because of its inci-
dental detriment to private rights. This, in a word, is the issue
between "rigorism" and "laxism" to-day.
The maxim that property cannot be transferred by act of gov-
ernment from one private owner to another is a landmark of
our constitutional law. Indeed, it antedates our constitutional
law, for it is stated by Coke, while on Coke's authority a Massa-
chusetts magistrate of the seventeenth century pronounced void,
on this ground, a town vote which was meant to provide the local
minister with a dwelling-hopse at public expense.8 Though not
"Ives v. So. Buffalo Ry. Co. (19II) 2oI N. Y. 271.
'See Ashton v. Boston and Maine Ry. Co. (ig5) 222 Mass. 65.
'Giddings v. Brown, Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History,
Vol. I, p. 376.
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explicitly recognized even to this day in any state constitution,
so fundamental a principle of public morality soon found embodi-
ment in judicially enforced limitations on legislative power. In
early days the most obnoxious species of legislation from the
point of view of vested rights was to be found in so-called
"prerogative" acts, whereby legislatures frequently undertook to
adjudicate private controversies. In combating this evil, the
courts found the principle of the separation of powers and the
maxim against confiscation for private benefit their most potent
weapons. Thereafter the maxim was adduced in support of the
principle that the power of eminent domain may be exercised for
public purposes only; that is, for purposes deemed by the courts
to be public. Later still, and on the same basis, a similar dogma
was erected against the taxing power.4
Like most constitutional doctrines protective of private rights,
this maxim has to-day been assimilated into the judicial theory
of "due process of law." The form in which it confronts
projects of Social Insurance is illustrated by a passage from
Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion in the Oklahoma Bank Guaranty
case which runs as follows:
"It is well established by a series of cases that an
ulterior public advantage may justify a comparatively
insignificant taking of private property for what, in its
immediate purpose, is a private use."5
This utterance, taken in its context, is not without its reassuring
features. If the state may assess all banks to provide a fund
from which to recoup depositors in banks which fail, why may
it not assess employers to provide funds from which to recoup
employees for losses growing out of their employment? No
doubt if the court were bent on avoiding this conclusion, it
could seek refuge behind the phrase "comparatively insignificant";
yet hardly securely. For if this phrase implies a limitation
on the taxing power, it would seem that Mr. Justice Holmes'
characteristic caution in expression had this time betrayed him
into inaccuracy, since it does not appear that the insignificance
of the taking has ever been a criterion with the courts in passing
upon legislation challenged as confiscatory, when such legislation
was referable to the taxing power; the sole question with the
'Loan Associaiion v. Topeka (1874) 20 Wall. (U. S.) 655.
'Noble Bank v. Haskell (x91) 219 U. S. io4, iio.
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judges in such cases has always been whether an ulterior public
interest was served. And with reference to this question, it
seems to me that the entire implication of Mr. Justice Holmes'
opinion is that the concept of "public purpose," as a limitation
on the taxing power, is to be defined in light of the concept of
"general welfare," as a dimension of the police power; that
all the powers of the state march abreast and are of mutual
serviceability.
Yet, it is just at this point that constitutional "rigorism" will
enter a caveat. This will consist in drawing a sharp line between
the powers of taxation and eminent domain, on the one hand,
and the police power, on the other; and it will be argued that,
whereas the former comprise, by very definition, the power to
take property, the latter is a power of regulation merely, which
does not and cannot extend to the taking of property, or to what
is its equivalent, the compelling of its transfer from one person
to another. Accordingly, it will be insisted that while the police
power is a power to promote the public welfare, its ends must
be achieved by the methods inherent to it. Otherwise, the settled
boundaries between the great fields of governmental power will
speedily become obliterated, and all powers will assume the guise
of the one least susceptible of legal control, with the inevitable
result that private rights, in any valuable sense, will soon be at
an end.
This argument directs its appeal to that way of thinking which
sets public policy and the security of private rights in sharpest
antithesis, whereas the history of law proves that the recogni-
tion and protection of private rights by the state has always been
a phase, though but one phase, of public policy. Furthermore,
when we turn to the more readily accessible verdict of the
history of constitutional limitations, we find that the line so
insisted upon, as demarking regulation from taking, has been
by no means a stationary one, and we accordingly feel warranted
in questioning whether its present placement is necessarily so
definite, after all. Thus, shortly before the Civil War, the New
York Court of Appeals, in the famous Wynehamer case,6 set
aside an anti-liquor law on the ground that, as to existing stocks
of liquor, it constituted an act not of regulation but of destruc-
tion, and so of taking without just compensation. Thirty years
later, in Mugler v. Kansas,7 the United States Supreme Court
Wynehamer v. People (1856) i3 N. Y. 378.
(1887) 123 U. S. 623.
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sustained precisely the same kind of law as within the police
power, to which, it said, all property is at all times held subject.
In other words, the state may, in the exercise of its police
power, absolutely outlaw what was good property when it was
acquired. But even as to property remaining under the protec-
tion of the law it may, by the same power, limit the owner's
use and control thereof for the public benefit,8 and frequently
for what, in its immediate aspect, is a private benefit. Thus
the right of alienation may be restricted in the interest of
creditors, dependents, and heirs-at-law9 ; while in directing the
use of property held in common or in trust, and even of prop-
erty held in severalty which without regulation could not be
beneficially used, the state has large powers.
10 Finally, the state
may cast special obligations upon property which may be met
only by expenditures for prescribed purposes. So the expenses
of mine inspection may be charged against the owners of
mines11 ; of sanitary improvements, against the owners of
tenements&2 ; of constructing and maintaining grade crossings
and suitable trackage connections, against railroad companies'
3 ;
of laying and cleaning street sidewalks, against the owners of
abutting premises." In none of these cases is there a taking in
the sense of the term which is to-day established.
The problem may be approached from yet another angle. Con-
sider for instance the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Hawker v. New York. The appellant in this case had
been convicted of the crime of abortion in New York, in i878,
and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. An act of the legis-
lature, passed in 1893 and amended in 1895, made it a misde-
meanor for any person to practice medicine in the state after
conviction of a felony. Hawker violated this statute, and
appealed from his conviction under it on the ground that it
violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
'Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter (i9o8) 2o9 U. S. 49.
'Lemieux v. Young (909) 211 U. S. 489.
"'Head v. Ainoskeag Mfg. Co. (I885) 113 U. S. 9; Wurts v. Hoagland
(i885) ii4 U. S. 6o6.
Charlotte, etc., R. R. Co. v. Gibbes (1892) 142 U. S. 386.
"Health Department v. Trinity Church (895) 145 N. Y. 32.
' See C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Nebraska (1898) 170 U. S. 57; Wis., etc.,
R. R. Co. v. Jacobson (i9oo) 179 U. S. 287; C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v.
Illinois ex rel. Drainage Commissioners (i9o5) 200 U. S. 56i.
"Norwood v. Baker (x898) 172 U. S. 269.
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"On the one hand," said Mr. Justice Brewer, speaking
for the Court, "it is said that defendant was tried, con-
victed, and sentenced for a criminal offense. He suffered
the punishment pronounced. The legislature has no power
to thereafter add to that punishment. . . . On the other
hand, it is insisted that within the acknowledged reach of
the police power, a state may prescribe the qualifications
of one engaged in any business so directly affecting the
lives and health of the people as the practice of medi-
cine. . . . We are of opinion that this argument is
the more applicable and must control [the case] . ..
That the form in which this legislation is cast suggests the
idea of the imposition of an additional punishment for
past offenses is not conclusive. We must look at the
substance, and not the form; and the statute should be
regarded as though it in terms declared that one who had
violated the criminal laws of the state should be deemed
of such bad character as to be unfit to practice medicine,
and that the record of a trial and conviction should be
conclusive evidence of such violation." 15
Could a better illustration be demanded of the triumph of
"laxism" in our constitutional law, as I have earlier defined this
tendency? Looked at from the point of view of its operation
upon defendant's rights-which, as Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent-
ing opinion shows was the better established point of view-the
statute before the court was unquestionably an ex post facto law;
but looked at from the point of view of its tendency to promote
the ends of good government, it was within the police power;
and despite the weight of precedent, the latter point of view
prevailed. Why, then, should not the maxim against confiscation
meet with the like fate, if confronted with a well-considered
Minimum Wage or other Social Insurance scheme? Granted-that
in its immediate operation on private property, such a scheme
would, by certain standards, be confiscatory; yet can it be denied
that such a scheme would be calculated to further a widespread
public interest? At least, it would seem that the constitutional
issue must turn on this question, rather than on the question of
alleged confiscation; and the more so since, as I have already indi-
cated, the maxim against confiscation is to-day grounded on the
"due process" clause, which, however, we have been repeatedly
assured, does not override the power of the state to provide for
the public health, safety, morals, and welfare.' 6
' 3Hawker v'. New York (1898) i7o U. S. x89, I9i.
"See, especially, Atlantic Coast Line Co. v. Goldsboro (1914) 232 U. S.
548, and cases there cited.
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But the applicability of the maxim forbidding confiscation to
Social Insurance projects may be challenged from yet another
point of view. This maxim prohibits the taking of private prop-
erty save on certain conditions, which implies that the property
whose taking is thus forbidden has become definitely vested, in
accordance with the law, in some private owner. Thus the ques-
tion arises, in accordance with what law is property so vested?
No one, I take it, would deny that all businesses are subject, to a
greater or less extent, to public regulation for the public good,
notwithstanding the fact that profits may be thus more or less
curtailed. Yet what is this but to admit that the owner of a
business has no indefeasible right to the profits thereof until the
obligations legally chargeable against these have been met?
Undoubtedly a system of Social Insurance would comprise a
lien upon business profits but, from what has already appeared,
that fact would be far from classifying such a system as an
invasion of vested rights.
We are thus brought to consider the second objection to Social
Insurance legislation: the objection that the police power does
not extend to the regulation of the status of employment, at least
in the case of persons sui juris. In the Ives case the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Lochner v. The People of
New York 17 was cited for this proposition, but, I think quite
unwarrantably. The Lochner decision is undoubtedly open to
criticism for the assumption which it makes that the welfare of
the public is not affected by the hours of work of able-bodied
laborers engaged in ordinary employments, but it clearly admits
that the "freedom of contract," whether of employer or
employee, is subject to the state in the reasonable exercise of its
police power. And the more recent decision in Coppage v.
Kansas,' which is also frequently cited in this connection,
repeats the admission, albeit the Court fails to take the "judicial
cognizance" which it has in other cases, of the actual disad-
vantage of employees in entering into contracts with large
employers. 19 Moreover, if the concept of "freedom of contract"
amounts to anything, it ought to secure an owner at least as
great liberty of action in making contracts of sale as in making
17 (1905) 198 U. S. 45.
' (1915) 236 U. S. i.
'Holden v. Hardy (1898) 169 U. S. 366; Knoxville Iron & Coal Co.
v. Harbison (igoi) 183 U. S. 13; McLean v. Arkansas (19o9) 211
U. S. 539.
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contracts of employment. Yet it is established doctrine that if
a business is so widespread as to be of really public concern, the
state may regulate its charges, and that independently of any
right in the public to claim the service of the business. 20
The question of the constitutional validity of Social Insur-
ance depends, therefore, it seems to me, upon the existence of
"a real, a substantial" relation2l between a well-considered
measure embodying the idea and the public welfare, or rather,
perhaps, upon the existence of a widespread public conviction
that there is such a relation.2 2 Granted this much, and all other
questions become impertinent. Nor does this signify, by any
means, the negation of constitutional limitations: on the con-
trary, it signifies the affirmation of that species of constitutional
limitations which already control in the great majority of cases
touching the relation of legislative power and private rights.
Thus for one thing, it must be the public welfare which is
to be promoted by legislation demanding vindication by .this sort
of test, not simply the welfare of an individual or a class. The
recent Adamson Act may be considered as a case in point. ' Its
immediate benefits are to go to a comparatively restricted group
of workmen while the claims of other groups better entitled by
equity to legislative intervention in their behalf are ignored. It
is true that the enactment of the measure may be reasonably
thought to have averted a crisis, but in .such a way as to invite
its recurrence at any time, while the precise provisions of the
act bear only the remotest relation to the public welfare. Also,
far from springing from a widespread public conviction of its
necessity, it is notorious that this statute came as a complete
and most unpleasant surprise to almost everybody, while the
ambiguity of its provisions attests in the most striking fashion
their entire lack of constitutional bona fides. Nevertheless, I
think that the purport of these provisions, expressed unam-
biguously, and embodied in a general scheme betokening the
intention of Congress to put the relations of the great carriers
and their employees on a stable and equitable basis, would stand
"Munn v. Illinois (1876) 94 U. S. i13; German Alliance Insurance Co.
v. Lewis (1914) 233 U. S. 389.
'Powell v. Pennsylvania (1888) 127 U. S. 678.
' C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. McGuire (1911) 219 U. S. 549; Otis v. Parker
(i9o3) 187 U. S. 6o6; Noble Bank v. Haskell, supra; Price v. Illinois
(19.15) 238 U. S. 446; Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco (i91o) 216
U. S. 358.
SOCIAL INSURANCE LIMITATIONS
on a far different footing legally"-that they would, in fact, be
constitutional.
2 3
In the second place, however, the word "welfare" itself has
certain implications that are not to be disregarded in determining
the scope of legislative authority. From time immemorial the
concept of public welfare and that of justice between man and
man have existed side by side, taking color each from the other.
So far, therefore, as such decisions as those in the Ives and
Coppage cases imply that the "public welfare" is not to be
defined regardless of what is rightly due from one man to another
in a given situation, 'they are entitled to all respect. But this
is far from conceding that the legal standards of justice that
have come down to us from the past are to-day always adequate.
Take for instance the rule against "liability without fault." As
expressed in the common-law doctrine of the "assumption of the
risks of the trade" and as applied to the facts of modem machine
industry, the rule is the merest solecism-a contradiction in terms.
Again, consider Mr. Justice Pitney's suggestion in the Cop-
page case, that the Constitution does not permit a legislative dis-
tribution of the natural and inevitable advantages of wealth.
Of course not; but neither does it forbid the elimination of
many of the inequities that disparity of wealth and economic
power produce. For the purpose of the Constitution in protect-
ing wealth was to "establish justice" and "promote the general
welfare," and such presulnably is its purpose still.
The phrase "social justice" is one that has fallen into some
disrepute of late on account of the abuse of it by enthusiasts, and
so circumspect folk generally give it wide berth. It has none the
'The recent decision of the Supreme Court, Wilson v. New and Ferris,
Receivers (March i9, 19,7) Oct. Term, 1916. No. 115, sustaining the
Adamson Act seems to be based on the proposition that the act was an
allowable measure in meeting an extraordinary emergency which threat-
ened the total interruption of interstate commerce. The Court takes very
broad cognizance of the circumstances constituting the emergency. Feeling
as I do that the emergency was largely the result of the means employed
by the Government in meeting it, I must express my sympathy with the
views of the minority of the Court The words of Mr. Justice Day seem
especially appropriate:
"Inherently, such legislation requires that investigation and delib-
eration shall precede action. Nevertheless, Congress has in this
act itself declared the lack of sufficient information and knowledge
to warrant the action taken, and has directed an experiment to
determine what it should do.
"Such legislation, it seems to me, amounts to the taking of the
property of one and giving it to another in violation of the spirit
of fair play and the due process clause."
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less real meaning, and especially does it call attention to the
fact that the community as a whole ought to shoulder the burdens
of modem community life, rather than those classes which are
often made to do so precisely because they are least capable
of doing it. In the simple economy of a frontier society, it was
at once equitable and expedient to leave to the determination of
accident, or private contract, many relationships which the more
closely interwrought industrialized society of to-day must, both
in justice to its weaker members and in support of the defensive
powers of society, undertake to control directly. Hence the
movement for a rational system of Social Insurance. The old
time direct personal contact between master and servant has
long since largely vanished from the world of production, but it
is coming to be appreciated that the newer impersonal relation-
ship of capital and labor is not devoid of moral responsibilities
on both sides which the state is frequently warranted in attempt-
ing to elevate to legal responsibilities. Moreover, while the
economic burden of Social Insurance must fall primarily upon
investment capital, ultimately it will come to rest, as part and
parcel of the whole cost of production, upon society at large.
Nor is this to say that the courts must .take cognizance of the
speculations of political economists; for they can and do take
cognizance of the practices of industry and commerce24 ; and
at any rate it must be presumed that they may do whatever is
necessary to a beneficial exercise of their powers.
It is, therefore, incredible that an intelligent tribunal would
to-day endeavor to classify a well-considered Minimum Wage
law, Workmen's Compensation law, or Social Insurance law
with bills of pains and penalties, legislative forfeitures, or acts
of confiscation, or as an attempt to limit "freedom of contract"
unreasonably and arbitrarily. "Jurisprudence," the Court itself
has informed us, "is a progressive science. 2 5 No doubt the
admission may be unfairly stressed, since the normal function of
the law is conservative, and not even the reformer would have it
otherwise, once he has attained his objective. Still the fact
remains that constitutional principles, which interpreted very
adequately the needs of a prosperity resting upon individual
thrift and exertion, to-day leave a great part of the industrial
organism sprawling outside the legal shell. Such a situation,
'Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District (1887) 120 U. S. 489.
Holden v. Hardy, sup ra.
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clearly, cannot endure nor be endured indefinitely. This would
be the fact even though we could be confident henceforth of the
immunity we have so long enjoyed from troublesome interna-
tional relationships; the appreciation that we cannot enjoy such
imnity only makes the problem the more imperious. And this
is to say that the great effort toward national reorganization
which is to-day just getting under way and the goal of which
we have labelled "preparedness" has its constitutional phase,
the solution of which will, necessarily, fall in considerable part
to the courts. In endeavoring their task, the judges cannot do
better than to hark back to the view of our Constitution with
which Chief Justice Marshall essayed so successfully a similar
work-the view of it as an instrument "intended to endure for
ages and consequently to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs.
'26
Since the foregoing was written the Supreme Court has ren-
dered two decisions of much significance in connection with the
matters herein discussed. In the New York Central Railroad Co.
v. White27 it sustained the recent New York Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, and in the Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington
2s
it upheld the Washington statute. Both these acts are of the
"compulsory" type and govern hazardous employments, but
there is this important difference between them. Whereas the
New York act leaves the employer free to insure himself against
the risks which it creates and accordingly puts it in his power
to lessen these and the consequent expense by careful manage-
ment, employers under the Washington statute must make an
annual contribution to a state fund which is proportioned to the
number of their employees entirely regardless of the extent to
which injury has befallen such employees.
In the New York case Chief Justice White, speaking for a
unanimous court, had little difficulty in disposing of the "liability
without fault" argument. The idea, said he, "is not a novelty
in the law," citing the common-law liability of innkeepers, the
rule as to dangerous things, and the principle of respondeat
superior. "In excluding the question of fault as a cause of
injury," he continued, "the act in effect disregards the proximate
cause and looks to one more remote-the primary cause, as it
'McCulloch v. Maryland (819) 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 3X6, 415.
(March 6, 1917) U. S. Sup. Ct, Oct Term, 1916. No. 32o.
(March 6, 19,7) U. S. Sup. Ct, Oct Term, 1g16. No. 13.
34
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may be deemed-and that is the employment itself." Also, he
shrewdly pointed out that, "just as the employee's assumption
of ordinary risks at the common law presumably was taken into
account in fixing the rate of wages, so the fixed responsibility
of the employer [under the new system] presumably will be
reflected in the wage scale."
The Washington case was decided by a closely divided court,
Justice Pitney speaking for the majority. "The crucial inquiry
under the Fourteenth Amendment," said he, "is whether it [the
act] appears to be not a fair and reasonable exertion of govern-
mental power, but so extravagant or arbitrary as to constitute
an abuse of power." The following passage from the Court's
answer to this question is of such importance from the point of
view of Social Insurance projects that it deserves extensive
quotation:
"Special burdens are often necessary for general bene-
fits-for supplying water, preventing fires, lighting dis-
tricts, cleaning streets. . . Regulations for these
purposes may press with more or less weight upon one
than another, but they are designed, not to impose unequal
or unnecessary restrictions on anyone, but to promote,
with as little individual inconvenience as possible, the
general good. . . Certainly, the operation of industrial
establishments that in the ordinary course of things fre-
quently and inevitably produce disabling or mortal injuries
to the human beings employed is not a matter of wholly
private concern. It hardly can be questioned that the state
might expend public moneys to provide hospital treatment,
artificial limbs, or like aid to persons injured in industry,
and home or support for the widows or orphans of those
killed. Does direct compensation stand on less secure
ground? A familiar exercise of state power is the grant
of pensions to disabled soldiers and to the widows and
dependents of those killed in war. Such legislation usually
is justified as fulfilling a moral obligation or as tending to
encourage a public duty of defense. But is the state
powerless to compensate with pensions or otherwise those
who are disabled, or the dependents of those whose lives
are lost, in the industrial occupations that are so neces-
sary to develop the resources and add to the wealth and
prosperity of the state? A machine as well as a bullet
may produce a wound . . , 'the workman is the
soldier of organized industry accepting a kind of pension
in exchange for absolute insurance on his master's
premises.' Stertz v. Industrial Insurance Commisskn, 158
Pac. Rep. 256, 263. It is said that the compensation or
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pension under this law is not confined to those who are
left without means of support. This is true. But is the
state powerless to succor the wounded except they be
reduced to the last extremity? Is it debarred from com-
pensating an injured man until his own resources are first
exhausted? This would be to discriminate against the
thrifty in favor of the improvident. The power and dis-
cretion of the state are not thus circumscribed by the
Fourteenth Amendment."
It seems to me that this utterance by the Justice who spoke for
the Court in the Coppage case goes very far indeed to dispense
with the notion of an indefeasible right of either property or
contract as against the reasonable exercise by the state of its
police powers. In other words, constitutional "rigorism" is at
an end.
EDWARD S. CORWIN.
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